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1 Introduction
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
are the world’s biggest promise – a global
agreement to reduce poverty and human
deprivation at historically unprecedented rates
through collaborative multilateral action. They
differ from all other global promises for poverty
reduction in their comprehensive nature and the
systematic efforts taken to specify, finance,
implement, monitor and advocate them.
While many different ideas have influenced the
‘final’ form and content of the MDGs1 two
specific ideas – human development and results-based
management – are identified as having particular
significance. However, the ways in which these
ideas influenced the evolution of the MDGs has
been mediated by many different political
interests.
Human development2 has become a central idea
in international development since the early
1990s. It posits that human beings are the ends as
well as the means of development, challenging the
focus of many economists and policymakers on per
capita economic growth. It has encouraged a focus
on the poor and poorest and the prioritisation of
capability enhancing services (such as food
security, primary education and basic health). It
justifies a multidimensional conceptualisation of
human wellbeing and poverty, although there are
heated debates about the exact dimensions of
human development. The works of Paul Streeten
et al. (1981), Mahbub ul Haq (1995) and Amartya
Sen (1999) are seen as seminal to this concept.
The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) Human Development Reports have been
highly effective in mobilising a constituency
promoting human development.
Results-based management (RBM),3 or
performance management, has been central to
efforts to improve public service delivery since
the 1980s and was highlighted in Osborne and
Gaebler’s (1992) influential book Reinventing
Government. RBM is a ‘strategy aimed at
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achieving important changes in the way
government agencies operate with improving
performance (achieving better results) as the
central orientation … a key component is the
process of objectively measuring how well an
agency is meeting its stated goals or objectives’
(Binnendijk 2001: 3). This encourages a focus on
identifying and continuously monitoring Goals,
Targets and Indicators. These should be SMART,
i.e. specific, measurable, agreed, realistic and
time-limited. This focus on ‘measurables’ leads
to a reduced interest in difficult-to-measure
goals, such as human rights, participation and
democracy.
This article provides a rapid chronological
account of the processes that created the MDGs
and an analysis using a framework that explores
the ways in which ideas, institutions and material
capabilities (economic and military power)
interact when global policy is being formulated
and implemented.4 The main objective of the
article is to deepen the understanding of the
complex ways in which ideas and interests have
interacted to shape the form and content of the
MDGs and draw lessons from this experience
about what should happen after 2015. The
conclusion identifies three main lessons. First, it
argues that the MDGs have had only limited
impact on policies and actions because the idea
behind them, human development, was never
fully institutionalised. Human development fell
between two stools: it did not lead to the
emergence of a mass social movement for poverty
eradication nor did it create an elite epistemic
community that could gain control of the policy
agenda. Second, the article points out the
disjuncture that occurred with global goals, the
MDGs being operationalised by country level
Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs) overseen by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank. PRSs need to be genuinely owned by
countries and the IMF and World Bank need to
introduce internal ‘Arrogance Reduction
Strategies’ to transform their control-oriented
cultures. Finally, the conclusion questions
whether we need a new idea to mobilise and
guide post-2015 pro-poor policy?
2 A brief history of the MDGs:5 phase 1 –
antecedents and UN summits
The idea of a dramatic attempt to eradicate or
reduce global poverty has antecedents that go
back to the mid-twentieth century: the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); the
Development Decade of the 1960s; the many UN
summits of the second half of the twentieth
century; and, books, reports and associated
advocacy exercises on the issue (e.g. Galbraith
1979; Myrdal 1970). While the UDHR and some
of the UN goal-setting exercises (Jolly 2003)
have fostered concerted action, most of these
initiatives did not move much beyond the
aspiration stage. Around 1980, the idea of a
concerted multilateral effort at global poverty
reduction stalled, with the arrival of Reagan and
Thatcher and the intellectual ascendancy of
neoliberal ideas.
By 1990, this climate had changed and the year
marked a watershed in the evolution of ideas
about international development and poverty
reduction. Against the backdrop of the end of the
Cold War it saw the World Bank’s World
Development Report 1990 acknowledge the need for
economic reform to be accompanied by social
policies (especially primary education for girls).
Even more significantly, the first of the UNDP’s
Human Development Reports was published. This
made the idea of human development accessible
to a wider group of professionals and to the
serious media and gave social activists a relatively
coherent (and non-socialist) framework from
which to argue for policy change. Around this time
what Thérien (1999) calls the ‘UN paradigm’
began to take on a clearer form, strongly
influenced by human development thinking.
Rather than simply criticising the Washington
Consensus (Thérien’s ‘Bretton Woods Institutions
paradigm’) the UN increasingly began to
articulate an alternative approach.
The 1990s also saw a number of UN summits, to
which the processes leading to the MDGs can be
traced. The ‘Children’s Summit’ in New York in
1990, masterminded by Jim Grant of UNICEF, is
often seen as the origin of the MDGs. The peak
year for UN summitry was 1995, with the World
Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen
and the UN Fourth World Conference on
Women, held in Beijing. The Social Summit was
crucial for the MDGs as a global consensus was
reached that poverty eradication was the priority
for development (UNDP 1997: 108). It approved
the target of eradicating extreme income poverty
($1-a-day poverty as it came to be known) by
2015 and reaffirmed the agreements reached at
the Children’s Summit of 1990 and the
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reproductive health goals of the 1994
International Conference on Population and
Development. Implicitly it drew on the idea of
human development and viewed poverty as being
multidimensional. The agreement at
Copenhagen had particular legitimacy as 117
heads of state and government attended it – the
largest meeting of ‘heads’ there had ever been.6
In the same year, the women’s summit at Beijing
reaffirmed the goals of gender equality and
women’s empowerment. However, the energy and
drive of that summit, with its visions of
empowerment and promoting social and
economic equality, were not matched by its
impact on global agenda setting (Eyben 2006).
UN summits continued in the latter half of the
1990s, but the location for global goal setting
shifted to Paris. This was not part of any grand
plan. It was just that in Paris, there was a group
of aid agencies needing a set of global goals to
tackle their organisational problems – even if
they did not yet know this.
3 A brief history of the MDGs: phase 2 – from
summits to lists
In the mid-1990s most aid agencies had a big
problem. Their budgets were being reduced and
the total level of official development assistance
was in long-term decline. For the donor club, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development’s (OECD’s) Development
Assistance Committee (DAC), these were deep
problems. At the DAC high level meeting of May
1995 it was decided to establish a Groupe de
Reflexion to review the future of development aid.
Early on, the Groupe asked DAC staff to compile a
list of UN summit declarations and unexpectedly,
this listing became a focus for the Groupe.
Assembling lists of targets had become a common
device in the public services of OECD members,
as their governments had adopted RBM.
In May 1996, the DAC launched Shaping the 21st
Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation
(DAC 1996). This was 20 pages long, but
attention focused on its seven ‘International
Development Goals’ (IDGs).7 These were a
selective and adapted list that reflected OECD
interests, and particularly the interests of the
OECD’s bilateral aid agencies. Unsurprisingly,
they were headed by a target for reducing income
poverty, on the assumption that economic growth
was indispensable for poverty reduction. However,
they also included five ‘social development’ goals
(universal primary education, gender equality,
reduced infant mortality, reduced maternal
mortality and reproductive health for all) which
can be seen as a rough attempt to put the idea of
human development into practical action. The
UN paradigm was making progress. The IDGs
were endorsed at several OECD ministerial
meetings and by the G7 in 1996, 1997 and 1998
(Bradford 2002: 5). However, in many of the
OECD member countries the document did not
appear to have much political traction. The ‘like-
minded’ group of progressive donors (Denmark,
the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) took the
agreement seriously – indeed, literally – but they
were already pursuing IDG-type policies. They
had only limited leverage over more powerful
donors (the USA, Japan, the UK and France) and
multilateral institutions.
In developing countries, the IDGs had little or no
resonance. The responses of the major
multilaterals varied. For the UN, the report and
the IDGs had significance. While it was pleased
to see UN declarations re-affirmed, it did not
want to lose control of the processes that set the
global agenda. In time, it would produce
alternative lists (see below). The IDGs registered
in several parts of the World Bank, especially the
Poverty Unit of the Poverty Reduction and
Economic Management Network, but barely
registered at the IMF. The responses of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) varied, but
for more radical NGOs and the emerging
networks of anti-capitalist and anti-globalisation
groups, the IDGs were just rhetoric – platitudes
helping capitalism to mask its dependence on
the exploitation of labour and the environment.
4 A brief history of the MDGs: phase 3 – the UN
returns to centre stage
In 1998, the UN re-entered the game of global
target setting through planning the Millennium
Assembly of the United Nations, to be held at
New York in September 2000. The new
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, was keen to
make global poverty reduction central to the UN
agenda and avoid being simply driven along by
security and emergency issues as had happened
to his predecessors (Traub 2006: 147).
Countries, international agencies, NGOs,
networks and activists energetically began trying
to shape the content of the Millennium Assembly
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and Declaration. For the UN, the Millennium
Assembly had to be successful. The UN’s 50th
Anniversary Summit in 1997 was widely regarded
as a wasted opportunity. This time, it was felt,
there must be an ambitious agenda, and no
attention-diverting disagreements should
distract the media coverage. Annan appointed a
senior adviser, John Ruggie, to draft a pre-
Summit report. This report would be the basis
for a final round of negotiations to agree the
Millennium Declaration.
The report (Annan 2000) was launched on
3 April 2000, and titled We the Peoples: The Role of
the United Nations in the 21st Century. Poverty
eradication was its leading issue. However, it had
a somewhat different set of poverty reduction
goals than the IDGs. A comparison of the goals
prioritised in We the Peoples and those in DAC’s
Shaping the 21st Century reveals that a number of
goals do not appear or are watered down (the
‘losers’). Others appear on Annan’s listing but
not in the DAC listing (the ‘winners’). There are
three big losers: gender equality and women’s
empowerment; reproductive health; and goals
for the health sector. Arguably, the ‘winners’
were economic growth; technology; the setting of
goals for the rich countries; the environment;
and highlighting Africa’s problems (see Hulme
2009a for a detailed discussion). While there are
many differences between the IDGs and We the
Peoples, one overarching difference merits
particular attention: the goals identified in We the
Peoples had less of a human development focus
than the IDGs. The ‘capabilities’ of child
survival, maternal survival, reproductive health
and gender equality were much less evident.
We the Peoples provided a strong indication of the
most progressive agreement that Annan and his
advisers thought the Millennium Summit could
reach. But Annan also needed to find a way of
demonstrating that the UN was coordinating its
global poverty reduction efforts with the other
big players – the World Bank, IMF and the
OECD’s bilateral agencies. To this end, in June
2000, the leaders of the four major development
multilaterals launched A Better World for All:
Progress Towards the International Development Goals
(BWFA) (IMF et al. 2000). This document
reiterated the DAC’s 1996 IDGs almost exactly
and strongly re-affirmed the primacy of RBM
thinking (IMF et al. 2000: 2–3). Most
significantly, the goals in BWFA included
reproductive rights and reduced child and
maternal mortality – human development goals
that We the Peoples had omitted. Beyond its
content, BWFA revealed an important aspect of
the process of global poverty reduction goal
setting – it was a twin track process. The OECD,
with its vast resources, was continuing with its
IDGs, while the UN, a multilateral institution
with greater legitimacy but few resources, was
mounting a similar exercise to produce a list
from the Millennium Summit.8
Over summer 2000, there were frantic
negotiations about what should finally go into the
Millennium Declaration. The additions, deletions,
repositioning of items and compromises that
were agreed over these months worked – the
Millennium Declaration was unanimously
approved by 189 member states (and 147 national
leaders) at the UN General Assembly on
8 September 2000. The next formal stage of the
process was for the Secretary-General to draw up
a ‘road map’ showing how the world would
achieve global poverty reduction.
5 A brief history of the MDGs: phase 4 – from
New York to Monterrey
Before Kofi Annan could unveil his
implementation plan for global poverty reduction,
two tasks had to be completed. One was relatively
technical: converting the Millennium Declaration
text into specific goals and concrete targets. The
second was highly political: negotiating a deal
with the OECD and its members, so that they
would agree to put aside their IDGs. If this was
not done then there was the danger of the world
having two sets of poverty reduction goals – the
OECD’s IDG’s and the UN’s MDGs. The issue
came to a head at a World Bank-convened
meeting in March 2001 (see Hulme 2009a for an
extended discussion). This agreed that a task
force of experts from the DAC, World Bank, IMF,
and UNDP would finalise the goals.
It is clear from the ‘final’9 form of the MDGs that
the IDGs, as presented in BWFA (IMF et al. 2000),
were taken as the primary document. The reasons
for this have never been publicly explained, but
there are clear logical grounds related to the
arguments and evidence in this article:
z The IDGs were relatively coherent from a
human development perspective. The goals in
the Declaration lacked such coherence.
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z The IDGs were already structured in RBM
format – a short, clear list of measurables –
and the OECD members wanted such a
format to ensure that the increased aid they
were being pushed to provide would be used to
pursue aims they prioritised.
z The most powerful forces in these
negotiations, economically and politically (the
OECD’s members) and technically (the IMF
and World Bank), favoured the IDGs. While
the development paradigm preferred by the
Bretton Woods Institutions could not be
publicly resurrected, these organisations
ensured that the MDGs fully recognised the
centrality of income growth to poverty
reduction and that the variant of human
development the MDGs pursued was based on
a basic needs approach and not human rights
or reduced inequality.
Nevertheless, the negotiations had substance
and the IDGs were significantly amended. The
biggest loss, from a human development
perspective, was reproductive health. It was an
explicit goal in the IDGs, but the UN could not
entertain this because of the objections of a
small part of its membership (see Hulme 2009b).
The Millennium Declaration did lead to one major
addition to the IDG listing: the inclusion of
Goal 8, a Global Partnership for Development.
Developing countries were not going to accept a
set of goals in a UN document that applied only
to them. There had to be a goal indicating what
the rich world would contribute to global poverty
reduction efforts. However, there was a
qualitative difference between Goals 1–7 and
Goal 8 concerning quantitative targets and dates
for achievement, to which we will return below.
In his first Millennium Summit follow-up report
of 6 September 2001, titled We the Peoples: The Role
of the United Nations in the 21st Century (Annan
2001), Kofi Annan was at last able to unveil the
MDGs. Most UN members subsequently started
to refer to these goals and many used them as
part of their policy and planning processes. The
main exceptions to this were the USA10 and India.
Over the year following the Millennium Summit,
prospects for a concerted push on global poverty
reduction weakened. In part this was inevitable:
the Millennium fever that had fuelled progress
was over. More significant was the change of US
President. Power now rested with a Republican
President guided by a small group of neo-
conservative advisers, who were very suspicious,
perhaps more accurately dismissive, of the UN
and foreign aid. This was highly inauspicious for
the approaching UN Conference on
International Financing for Development (FFD),
now delayed until March 2002. This was where
agreement was to be reached on how the extra
US$50 billion the Zedillo Commission estimated
was needed for the MDGs to be achieved would
be raised. It seemed likely that President Bush
would not attend the FFD conference and
possible that the USA might detach itself from
the MDG process.
Two factors helped change this. First, in its
initial response to the 9/11 attacks, the Bush
administration thought a little more than it had
previously about ‘soft power’ approaches to
foreign policy. It showed interest in the role of
US foreign aid as an adjunct to the ‘war on
terror’. Second, the FFD conference was in
Monterrey and the Mexican President, Vicente
Fox, was convenor. President Bush had already
declared that Mexico was the USA’s most
important foreign partner and talked about his
close personal relationship with Fox. This put
pressure on him to accept the invitation to
Monterrey from his friend. As discussed in
Mallaby (2004), other factors (a meeting with
Bono, lobbying from Christian conservatives,
Condoleezza Rice outmanoeuvring Treasury
Secretary O’Neill) also encouraged Bush to
attend – and once he arrived there, he had to
show his generosity.11
So, while the commitments made at Monterrey
were well below the levels the Zedillo
Commission had identified, and many rich
countries had caveats around their aid, trade and
debt reforms, overall the FFD conference was
seen as a success. The MDGs were informally
approved there (but not formally ratified),
President Bush committed the USA to being part
of the mega-project for global poverty reduction
that the MDGs represented and the Monterrey
Consensus was forged. On paper at least, global
poverty reduction was now a high priority for all
countries and international institutions.
6 The ideas behind the MDGs
Human development and RBM come from two
very different intellectual traditions. Yet both
played leading ideational roles in the complex
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and sprawling processes that produced the
MDGs. Their forms of influence differed greatly,
however. RBM was applied to the MDGs in a
very direct fashion. At times Goals, Targets and
Indicators were screened for how ‘SMART’
(specific, measurable, agreed, realistic and time-
bound) they were. Panels of statistical experts
were convened to specify Targets and Indicators
and judgements made on RBM principles
impacted directly on MDG form and content. By
contrast, human development had a much more
diffuse influence. It contributed indirectly to the
thinking of many of those involved in the
processes leading to the MDGs but there is no
evidence that the idea was applied directly.12
While the idea of human development provided
an intellectual guide for UN conferences and
associated declarations, it promoted two specific
theoretical strands that became underpinnings of
the MDGs. First, it advanced the case that
development strategies needed to directly pursue
the goals of development, and not just the means.
Human development provided an overarching
conceptual framework for arguing that education
and health improvements and gender equality
were not only good in their own right but were
essential components for the pursuit of a dynamic
vision of development. The multidimensional
nature of the human development approach
created synergy in the interactions between each
of these goals. For example, educating children
increased their future productivity and income
and reduced future infant mortality rates. This
would lead to reduced fertility levels and permit
women to participate more fully in the market,
further raising household incomes. It was a
virtuous circle.
Second, when the convenors of the Social Summit,
the DAC and the UN drew up lists of goals, they
could explicitly or implicitly argue that a list was
needed as development and poverty reduction
were multidimensional – growth was not enough.
Lists of goals were not mere ‘shopping lists’
reflecting a failure to analyse problems and select
priorities (a criticism that had partly undermined
‘basic needs’ in the 1980s). Rather, a list of
multiple goals was essential for any serious
development effort based on rigorous thinking.
While the processes behind the placing of items
on such lists involved complex interactions –
involving ideas, empirical evidence, political
interests and personal values – human
development provided a well-reasoned case for
multidimensional lists. In the background were
the works of Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen
melding economics with philosophy to argue for
the promotion of capabilities. His name, along
with others, could be cited in an iconic fashion to
show that a deep theoretical foundation lay
behind such lists.
However, the power of ideas was only part of
what was shaping agreements. Interests,
articulated by the more economically powerful
countries and by international institutions, social
movements and the business sector, moderated
the influence of human development on the
MDGs. At the DAC, delegates realised that a
multidimensional list made it easier to enlist the
support of issue-based NGOs for increased
foreign aid. Having education, gender, health,
HIV/AIDS and environmental goals meant that
specialist NGOs – those concerned with children,
gender, HIV/AIDS, family planning, water, and
conservation – would find one of their
organisational objectives on the list. So, having a
multidimensional list was not only logical it also
had political advantages. More negatively, the
human development case for reproductive health
was challenged by an ‘unholy alliance’ of the
Vatican and conservative Islamic states, which
managed to get G7713 support for their initiative.
Consequently, the reproductive health goal
disappeared during the negotiations to finalise
the MDGs.
The ideational adjunct to human development
was results-based management. In the 1990s
RBM was on the ascendancy in Business and
Management Schools and in the pronouncements
of politicians and senior public servants,
especially in the rich world. Its commonsense
nature and linearity made it attractive – set
targets, monitor achievement and reward staff on
the basis of performance. It was adopted across
the public sector in Australia, Canada, Germany,
New Zealand, the UK and the USA and in the
systems of many development agencies (e.g.
CIDA, DFID, GTZ, NORAD, UNICEF and
USAID).14 For the aid-financed programmes of
the DAC and UN, it was particularly attractive.
The widely reported underperformance of aid in
earlier years, it could be argued, would not occur
in the future as RBM methods would ensure high
levels of performance.
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RBM and particularly its tenet of SMART
measures influenced the MDGs in three main
ways. First, it determined the structure of the
MDGs and explains why they are a nested
hierarchy of Goals, Targets and Indicators
focused on time-bound ‘outcomes’. Second, it
shaped the specification of goals. While
determining exactly what is ‘achievable’ is not an
exact science, one sees this tenet in operation
with the $1-a-day poverty target. At the UN
Summit in Copenhagen, this was set as
‘eradicating’ extreme poverty by 2015. When the
DAC applied its RBM thinking to this target it
was reduced to the more realistic ‘halving’
extreme poverty by 2015 as DAC statisticians
pointed out that ‘eradication’ would require
poverty reduction at rates vastly above anything
found in the historical record. Third, the idea of
RBM meant that the MDGs avoided potentially
difficult-to-measure goals like human rights and
participation – such goals were a concern for
economically emerging countries in Asia and
especially China. These issues could be placed in
the introductions and conclusions of key
documents, but not in the lists that are to guide
plans of action. As a result, the variety of human
development that impacted on the MDGs was
more a conceptualisation of basic needs than of
human rights or of social justice.
As with human development, political interests
moderated the full application of RBM. This is
most obvious for Goal 8, on ‘Developing a Global
Partnership for Development’, which set out
what the rich world would do to assist the fight
against poverty. The idea of RBM was rigorously
pursued for Goals 1–6 and partially applied to
Goal 7. However, it was systematically avoided
for Goal 8. While the like-minded group of
Northern European social democracies might be
willing to agree to 0.7 per cent of GDP to be
provided in aid by 2015 (they had already
achieved this), the USA, Japan and other rich
nations were certainly not going to agree to that
(Fukuda-Parr 2006). When powerful countries or
groups of countries or interest groups felt
threatened by what might be agreed, power
relations took precedence over ideas.
Perhaps it was to avoid moving into such political
terrain that those engaged in finalising the
MDGs neglected to specify the level at which the
MDGs were to be monitored – an important
element of any robust attempt to apply RBM
thinking. This is the topic of the next section as
it provides important lessons about the design of
future goals and the processes of accountability
that surround them.
7 Monitoring the MDGs and public accountability
While there is much technical and policy debate
among professionals about the findings of UN and
World Bank MDG monitoring reports, in theory
this data should be part of broader political
processes of public accountability. If goals and
targets are on track then accountability processes
should provide positive feedback to those engaged
in global poverty reduction. Conversely, if goals
are not being achieved, then accountability
processes should test whether these targets are
reasonable and, if they are, should put pressure on
governments, multilateral agencies and their
leaders to perform better. International
accountability processes are always complex and
this is particularly the case when a vast number of
autonomous agents are producing a public good –
such as global poverty reduction. Assessing the
contribution, or lack of contribution, of each agent
to the goal, and relating that to goal achievement,
may appear virtually impossible. The
accountability issue has played out in many ways
over the MDGs but of particular significance from
an RBM perspective is the level at which
monitoring and accountability occur.
Should the MDGs be monitored purely at the
global level or is the main focus on the country
level? The UN’s Millennium Project, and
particularly its Director Jeffrey Sachs, has argued
that the MDGs are ‘country goals’, since (1) in a
world of sovereign states their operationalisation
has to be at the country level, and (2) they ‘…
need to be applied at the country level so
governments can be held accountable for signing
on to them’ (UN Millennium Project 2005: 3).
Sachs is particularly concerned that high levels
of achievement in China and India would mean
that global targets are met while progress in
other parts of the world is negligible. Implicitly,
Sachs does not trust the governments of many,
perhaps most, countries to set their own goals.
He has publicly railed against the USA, and to a
lesser degree other rich countries, not meeting
targets, but he is probably equally suspicious of
many poor country governments. However, in
attempting to demand country level
accountability for global goals is he contesting
the concept of national sovereignty, and could
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this particularly undermine the sovereignty of
poor countries and the right of their citizens to
demand national government accountability?
Jan Vandemoortele (2007) and other colleagues
in the UN believe that those who wish to monitor
the MDGs at country level – such as Sachs – have
‘misunderstood’ the goals. He argues that the
MDGs were set for the global level from
analysing historical global trends and were never
intended to be applied to countries or regions.
Vandemoortele is particularly concerned that
this would lead to reporting that identifies
countries as being ‘poor performers’, despite the
fact that economic and social conditions in those
countries are getting better. He believes that this
will both disempower national governments and
undermine public support if MDG failures are
reported when indicators are improving. What is
needed at the country level is a country-led
process of defining national poverty reduction
goals based on the trajectories of MDG-type
indicators for that specific country, and the
development of a plan to meet those targets
through a series of intermediate targets
(probably every three years). In this way, poverty
reduction becomes part of the national political
agenda and could be directly linked to national
budgets. In effect, Vandemoortele sees the global
MDGs as a device for mobilising rich country
commitment to poverty eradication, and national
level targets as the device for getting national
governments to take action against poverty.
In practice, accountability for poverty reduction
has been lacking at both the global and the
national levels. The UN General Assembly can
agree global goals for poverty reduction but it
lacks the authority to hold member states
accountable for their contributions and
achievements. Even in the most extreme and
clear situation, with Robert Mugabe and the
ZANU-PF government actively creating poverty
in Zimbabwe for almost a decade, the UN has
proved virtually powerless. If the UN, and other
associations of states, can do nothing about a
government that by all the objectively verifiable
indicators has driven millions of its people into
poverty what could it do about a leader or
government that was moderately ‘off track’?
Vandemoortele’s proposal for a genuinely
national level accountability process is more
feasible, in a world of sovereign states and in
terms of relating actions to results, but it
assumes that states are operating democratically
and that poverty reduction is genuinely a major
political issue. Unfortunately, these assumptions
appear to be rarely valid.15 In most low-income
countries, PRSs have not set explicit goals, so
accountability is diffuse, and PRSs and/or
poverty have not become an issue on the
domestic political agenda. Instead, poverty
targets and plans have tended to be documents
produced to keep international agencies and
donors satisfied, not something for citizens to
take seriously. In many high-income countries,
the situation has not been much better. National
leaders and governments have signed up to UN
agreements to increase aid, reduce debt, make
trade fairer and reduce global warming. They
have then walked away from these commitments
and little or no demands for accountability have
been made by citizens.
8 Conclusion: do we need a new idea?
Three main lessons can be drawn from this
account of MDG history. First, while the idea of
human development made great progress over
the 1990s, this was the result of shifting
networks and coalitions of actors and did not
produce a robust institutional support for the
promotion of the idea. Human development did
well but it fell between two stools. It did not lead
to the emergence of a self-fuelling social
movement that could consistently place human
development on the political agenda when
decisions were being taken.16 The closest it came
to this was with time-limited campaigns
mounted by coalitions of NGOs and faith-based
organisations such as Jubilee 2000, Make Poverty
History and ONE. Nor did it stimulate the
emergence of an elite epistemic community (in
academia, the professions and the media) that
was agreed on a narrowly defined analytical
framework and that could dominate decision-
making in key organisations, as had the
neoliberal epistemic community in the IMF,
World Bank, US Treasury and ministries of
finance around the world.17 Those who wish to
see the idea of human development genuinely
shape policies and resource allocations post-2015
may need to put less time and effort into refining
the minutiae of the concept and more time and
effort into how to institutionalise the idea more
fully. Could human development be honed down
and politicised in a way that would foster the
emergence of a social movement? Alternatively,
could the idea’s leading proponents chart a route
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for the creation of a tight-knit epistemic
community that might wrest control of technical
advice on public policy in the most powerful
organisations away from neo-classical economists
with a neoliberal orientation?18
A second lesson is that if the post-2015 agenda
pursues a global goal-setting approach, then the
mechanisms by which these relate to national
policies and politics in poorer countries – plans,
budget allocations, medium-term expenditure
frameworks, activities, approval and
accountability – must be reformed. In the last
decade this linkage has occurred through
national PRSs that have been tightly overseen by
the IMF and World Bank, and have made the
notion of ‘country ownership’ a joke in developing
countries (Hulme 2010a). As soon as possible,
and definitely after 2015, the design of such
mechanisms needs to shift authority and
responsibility for such plans genuinely to country
governments. A corresponding cultural change
will be needed at the Bretton Woods Institutions,
especially the IMF. They will need to adopt
‘Arrogance Reduction Strategies’ and learn not to
believe that they know precisely what are the best
policies for each specific country. The redesign of
the ways in which global goals, national goals,
national plans and budgets interact should
remove the present-day ‘misunderstanding’ about
whether global goals have to be monitored (and
by inference met) at country level. This will
provide opportunities to strengthen
accountability. A similar process is needed in rich
countries where citizens must be encouraged to
ask, ‘why do we let our politicians make big
promises about global poverty reduction and let
them walk away from these promises?’.
Finally, those pushing for pro-poor policies will
need to distinguish between the dramatic
changes in the context for development between
2000 and 2010 (or 2015) and the lack of change in
the ‘rules of the game’ that determine global
public policies and actions. The context has
changed dramatically: markets are more volatile
and reconfiguring with the rise of China and
India; populations are ageing; climate change is
under way; technological advance continues at
unprecedented rates; and patterns of global
governance are shifting as the G8 morphs
towards a G20 (Sumner and Tiwari 2009). But
the rules of the game have not changed: countries
that are more economically and militarily
powerful, and business interests will continue to
play a dominant role in determining global public
policies and in setting the limits of the degree to
which these policies are actioned (or not
actioned). Proponents of poverty eradication can
tackle this directly by protests about aid, trade
and debt. But in the long term, it will be more
subtle strategies that will engineer pro-poor
global policies and actions. What are needed are
strategies to shift international norms so that the
citizens of the present rich countries (North
America, Europe and other OECD countries) and
future rich countries (China, India, Brazil and
others) find the existence of extreme poverty in
an affluent world morally unacceptable (see
Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2009 for an elaboration).
Such a shift would generate social forces that can
moderate and even confront the interests of
powerful countries and corporations, as happened
with the slave trade and other norms (Finnemore
and Sikkink 1998). This would be an
incrementalist process and would need a well-
articulated idea behind it to capture the public
imagination. Perhaps the biggest question for the
post-2015 poverty eradication agenda is ‘what is
that idea?’. Is it human development à la the
MDGs; or is it a revised and repackaged version
of human development (promoting human rights
or reducing global inequality); or, has human
development passed its ‘sell-by’ date ... do we
need a new idea?
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Notes
* This article is based on Hulme (2007).
1 The initial specification of the MDGs in Kofi
Annan (2001) was presented as the final
version but with some further technical work
to occur. However, in 2005, two additional
targets were added.
2 To explore the vast literature on human
development, see Alkire (2002), Clark (2002), 
Fukuda-Parr and Shiva Kumar (2003), ul Haq
(1995), Nussbaum (2000) and Qizilbash
(2006), inter alia.
3 See Locke and Latham (1990) and Heinrich
(2002) for reviews. Results-based
management is a sub-field of a wider and
more theorised body of work, new public
management (Minogue et al. 1998).
4 For more details, see Hulme (2010a and 2010b
forthcoming).
5 For a detailed history of the MDGs, see
Hulme (2009a).
6 A noticeable absentee was President Clinton.
US reticence about the UN’s social
development agenda was not confined to
Republican constituencies.
7 There are only six bullet points as maternal
and child mortality reduction were merged
into one.
8 Annan was subjected to vitriolic attacks by a
number of NGOs for sharing a common set of
goals with the IMF and World Bank.
9 The MDGs were significantly modified after
the 2005 Summit to include two new targets,
‘reproductive health’ and ‘decent work’, and
12 new indicators.
10 As late as 26 August 2005, the US Ambassador
to the UN, John Bolton, wrote to his peers: the
‘United States supports the development goals
of the Millennium Declaration … [but the]
“Millennium Development Goals” … are a
[UN] Secretariat product, which member
states never formally ratified’.
11 At the Monterrey meeting, he staggered his
critics and supporters by announcing that ‘the
core development’ budget would increase by
50 per cent over the next three years.
12 At the time that the MDGs were being
agreed, there were several lists of human
development goals (Alkire 2002; Clark 2002),
but I can find no record of any attempt to use
such specifications to shape the MDGs.
13 The G77 is the association of the UN’s
developing countries. It now has a
membership of 130 countries, many of which
have achieved middle-income status.
14 Respectively, the Canadian International
Development Agency, UK’s Department for
International Development, Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
(German Technical Cooperation), Norwegian
Agency for Development Cooperation, United
Nations Children’s Fund and United States
Agency for International Development.
15 Exceptions include Brazil and Chile where
parties have had to compete over poverty
reduction policies, and the UK, where policy
towards global poverty reduction is seen as an
issue, although not a leading issue, for voters.
16 See Hulme (2010a forthcoming) for an analysis
of why a social movement did not emerge.
17 Whether the Human Development and
Capabilities Association (HDCA) formed in
2004 can shape its membership into an
epistemic community remains to be seen.
18 In the USA this is sometimes presented as the
‘saltwater economists’ (New England and
California) and displacing the ‘freshwater
economists’ of Chicago.
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